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This paper studies the determinants of naturalization among Turkish and ex-Yugoslav 
immigrants in Germany differentiating between actual and planned citizenship. Using the 
German Socio-Economic Panel, we measure the impact that integration and ethnicity 
indicators exert on the probability to naturalize beyond the standard individual and human 
capital characteristics. A robust finding is that German citizenship is very valuable to female 
immigrants and the generally better educated, but not to those educated in Germany. We find 
that the degree of integration in German society has a differential effect on citizenship 
acquisition. While a longer residence in Germany has a negative influence on actual or future 
naturalization, arriving at a younger age and having close German friends are strong 
indicators of a positive proclivity to citizenship acquisition. Likewise, ethnic origins and 
religion also influence these decisions. Muslim immigrants in Germany are more willing to 
become German citizens than non-Muslim immigrants, but there are also fewer German 
citizens among Muslims than among non-Muslims. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Immigrant citizenship acquisition is a much discussed, debated, and still a heated 
topic in German immigration politics. After decades of doing nothing about an 
immigration policy and refusing to admit that Germany is an immigrant country, the 
German government of 2001, taking a pioneering position, introduced the 
Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) a reduced and compromised version of which 
came into effect on January 1, 2005. The citizenship laws in this Act allow foreigners 
to obtain citizenship in a much more proactive stance towards integration. Among 
other things, immigrants should take 650 hours of language instruction, demonstrate 
knowledge of the German constitution and take an oath of allegiance to the Basic Law 
of the Federal Republic of Germany. Since 2000, some immigrants like the Turks, 
also need to sign a document renouncing their previous citizenship and promising that 
they will not acquire a second citizenship after the take the German one.
1  
 
Currently, immigrants can apply for German citizenship after eight years of residency 
in Germany, with numerous exceptions allowing the naturalization process to begin as 
early as 3 years after arrival if one is married to a German citizen. Bloodlines (ius 
sanguinis a patre et a matre) are no longer the only route to citizenship; the law of 
soil (ius soli) is also implemented in Germany for the children. Additional eligibility 
requirements for immigrant citizenship ascension are: assurance and demonstration of 
one’s own subsistence and the subsistence of his or her dependents without recourse 
to benefits, possession of adequate knowledge of German, and knowledge of the legal 
system, the society and living conditions in Germany, and a criminal free record.  
 
                                                 
1 The first reform to the German nationality law, dated in 1913, came into effect on January 1, 2000. 
Dual citizenship is allowed under certain circumstances, to all EU nationals, and to the children of 
binational marriages.    2
Before the new 2000 law the long time frame of up to 15 years of residence (ius 
domicilii) and the stiff monetary fee (up to 5,000 DM at times) did not give 
immigrants the “right” to citizenship, which was up to the discretion of German 
officials. Although since the 1990s the laws to acquire citizenship are less stringent, 
many immigrants choose not to become German citizens. 
 
Immigrant citizenship ascension rose after the new citizenship law was enacted. In 
2000 alone 186,688 immigrants acquired German citizenship, while in contrast during 
the 1980s only 133,000 foreigners were naturalized over the entire decade. It should 
be noted that in 2000 naturalizations peaked after a four decade rise. After 2000 
naturalizations declined and in 2005, 117,241 immigrants received German 
citizenship.
2 German officials announced in July 2007 that the number of naturalized 
immigrants had risen to 124,832 in 2006, an increase of 6.5 percent over the previous 
year (Deutsche Welle, 2007). 
 
Despite thousands of cases of naturalization of immigrants in Germany, there are 
many foreigners residing in Germany who choose not to naturalize, or who have 
postponed their naturalization. To visualize the number of people who do not acquire 
German citizenship in spite of being qualified for it, we calculate some rough 
estimates of the number of people who are qualified to receive German citizenship in 
the years 2004 and 2005, and compare these numbers to the actual naturalization 
                                                 
2 Statistics used in this paragraph do not include the cases of naturalization by ethnic Germans, who 
started returning to Germany from the Soviet bloc in early 1990s. Unlike all other immigrants, ethnic 
Germans are guaranteed the right to German citizenship upon their arrival to Germany. When the 
German citizenship acquisition cases are taken into account, the naturalization statistics increases by 2 
to 3 times. No naturalization statistics are available for returning ethnic Germans after 2000. Because 
different laws apply to ethnic Germans and all other immigrants arriving to Germany, the citizenship 
acquisition behavior may differ between these two migrating groups. For the purposes of this study, we 
limit our discussion only to citizen acquisition process by ethnically non-German immigrants.  
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statistics in Table 1. After the minimum requirement for length of residency, the time 
that it takes to complete the naturalization process, and the yearly outflow of 
immigrants are taken into consideration, the predicted number of immigrants who 
arrived to Germany in 1997 and were eligible for German citizenship in 2005 is 
391,460. This is three and a half times higher than the actual number of immigrants 
(117,241) who naturalized in Germany during that year. This 30 percent ascension 
rate is in sharp contrast to other European countries as well as the Canadian and US 
experience.
3 In fact, the actual difference between the number of people eligible to 
acquire German citizenship by 2005 and the number of immigrants who actually have 
acquired German citizenship during that year might even be larger, as there are many 
other immigrants who have nominally qualified for German citizenship prior to 2005, 
but who have apparently postponed their naturalization. 
 
The crux of the matter is why some eligible legal immigrants do not naturalize, why 
some do, and are there any internal or external barriers to this process? This paper 
studies the determinants of naturalization among immigrants who do acquire German 
citizenship, immigrants who have not obtained citizenship but are willing to receive it 
in the future, and immigrants who do not want to acquire German citizenship. In 
particular, using the 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we 
measure the impact that integration and ethnicity indicators exert on the probability to 
naturalize beyond the standard individual and human capital characteristics. We 
conjecture that the degree of integration in German society can have a differential 
effect on the three aforementioned categories of citizenship acquisition. Likewise, 
ethnic origins and religion also influence these decisions.  
                                                 
3 Sweden and Canada have ascension rates in excess of 70 percent of their eligible immigrant 
populations. In the US the figure is slightly less than 50 percent.   4
 
We use the 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Our data 
indicate that practically no respondents acquired the German citizenship after 2000, 
under the new German citizenship legislation. This means that the implementation of 
the new German citizenship law had no effect on the sampled immigrant’s citizenship 
ascension decision. Given the limited number of post-2000 sampled immigrants we 
cannot control for the potential effects of Germany’s new citizenship law in our 
empirical naturalization model. The GSOEP samples all legal immigrants in 
Germany. Since rarely any immigrant from an EU member state has taken the 
German citizenship or has indicated an interest to naturalize, our study concentrates 
on the sample of Turks and Ex-Yugoslavs only.  
 
In the following section we review previous related literature on citizenship 
acquisition and consequences thereof and develop our research question. In section III 
we present our data, variables and model. In section IV we discuss the results of our 
empirical analysis. We conclude in section V with a discussion of potential policy 
outcomes of our findings.     
 
 
II. RELEVANT LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The naturalization of immigrants has been traditionally considered by economists 
within the framework of economic integration into the destination society. The 
interest of most economic research on naturalization has been directed towards labor 
market effects of citizen acquisition. Bratsberg et al. (2002) find that the 
naturalization of young immigrant men in the US positively affects their integration 
into the local labor market; they have higher wages and are more likely to be   5
employed in white-collar jobs than comparable males without American citizenship. 
Similarly, DeVoretz and Pivnenko (2004) demonstrate that Canadian immigrant 
wages increase after citizenship acquisition. The empirical results of Mata (1999), 
however, indicate no relationship between naturalization and immigrants’ wages in 
Canada. Conflicting results also arise in the European context when studying the 
economic impact of citizenship acquisition in Europe. Fougère and Safi (2006), for 
example, find that naturalization has a strong positive impact on the employment 
probability of immigrants in France, especially for those immigrants who would less 
likely be employed. In contrast, Bevelander (2000) finds in the Swedish context that, 
after naturalization, immigrants in Sweden become less economically active, and thus, 
are less likely to participate in the local labor market than prior to acquiring Swedish 
citizenship.  
 
While naturalization in Denmark bears no significant effect on the probability to 
work, once naturalized immigrants join the labor market, they earn more (Constant 
and Zimmermann, 2005). In comparison to Germany, this same study finds that 
naturalized immigrants in Germany are more likely to work in paid-employment, less 
likely to go into self-employment, but they earn more in both self- and paid-
employment. Lastly, citizenship acquisition is not a significant determinant of the 
earnings of German guestworker men and women (Constant, 1998). This is indicative 
of the fact that the legal status of immigrants may not be enough for earnings 
assimilation and that the citizenship variable can confine various other issues. 
Earnings assimilation of guestworkers is not as much a legal issue as it is a function of 
their social and economic and ethnic stratification. The reasons why immigrants 
pursue and acquire citizenship become therefore pertinent.    6
 
Few economists recognize the possibility that the naturalization of immigrants might 
be endogenous in their modeling of economic effects of citizenship acquisition 
(DeVoretz, 2006). Whether or not to naturalize in the destination country is a choice 
that immigrants make at some point after immigration. Their decision depends on 
various socio-economic, individual as well as demographic factors. DeVoretz and 
Pivnenko (2004), find that the decision to acquire Canadian citizenship among 
immigrants from developing countries depends on their age, marital status, presence 
of children, as well as their wages. Immigrants from developed countries, on the other 
hand, base their decision on their expectations of economic gains from citizenship. 
Citizenship acquisition is also important when studying the return migration of 
immigrants. Being a German citizen exerts a strong influence on the probability of 
going back to the country of origin, as it enables immigrants to a free exit and entry in 
Germany (Constant and Zimmermann, 2007). Studying dual citizenship allowance in 
the US, Mazzolari (2006) finds that those who come from countries which recently 
permitted dual citizenship are more likely to naturalize in the US.  
 
This limited body of economic research on citizenship acquisition is in sharp contrast 
to the extensive research conducted by sociologists. The ground breaking work of 
Bernard (1936) demonstrates that the decision to naturalize positively relates to the 
immigrants’ education, occupation, and family income. The choice to naturalize 
might also depend on the level of immigrants’ assimilation within the native society 
in Australia (Evans, 1988). In contrast, Portes and Cutris (1987) argue that the 
naturalization decision does not depend on any demographic characteristics, or on the 
immigrants’ level of assimilation, but rather on what roots immigrants have placed in   7
the host country, the residential patterns of both the sending and receiving countries, 
and the barriers that immigrants face after immigration and prior to making their 
naturalization decision. In addition, Young (1994) concludes that the naturalization 
decision depends on extant characteristics found in the immigrants sending country as 
well as the immigrants’ ethnic group.  
 
Our study follows existing research which emphasizes the role of country destination 
and the particular ethnic group under consideration. Therefore, we argue, to 
understand the dynamics of citizenship acquisition among non-EU immigrants in 
Germany, we cannot rely on the modeling and findings of immigrant acquisition in 
other immigrant destination countries like the US, Canada, and various European 
countries.  
 
Thus, our paper concentrates on the differences in the decision process to acquire 
citizenship for Turkish and former Yugoslav immigrant residents in Germany. The 
choice of the two immigrant groups is motivated by the fact that these are the two 
largest modern immigrant groups in Germany. Moreover, unlike other countries that 
sent large numbers of guestworkers to Germany, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia 
are not members of the EU-15 or EU-25, and their emigrants do not enjoy the political 
and mobility privileges of this latter group.  
 
In addition, our study focuses on both the decision to actually naturalize and the 
immigrants’ willingness to acquire German citizenship sometime in the future. It is 
important to distinguish immigrants who do not have and do not want German 
citizenship from immigrants who do not have but would like to naturalize in   8
Germany. For many immigrants, changing citizenship and renouncing their own is not 
just a political issue; it is a very emotional one. The choice not to want to naturalize in 
Germany could be a signal of reluctance to completely integrate into the German 
society. It could also be that, for many first generation immigrants, a passport 
represents the link to their country of origin, to old friends, to good old times, to 
deceased parents, to their ethnic identity. This passport is like the last stronghold that 
defies the fact that they have been living abroad and Germany is their de facto 
country. Changing a passport is a betrayal to the origins. On the other hand, a 
willingness to naturalize in the future but not to have done it yet could indicate the 
possible presence of certain barriers such as the strict naturalization legislation in 
Germany, lack of time to devote to this lengthy process, financial constraints, or the 
fear of losing the citizenship of the country of origin. Having the German citizenship 
could be an indication of a conscientious political decision or a natural integration in 
the society. The difference between these motives is important for our study, as it 
might be defined by a different set of characteristics. In fact, we hypothesize that 
immigrants who have not naturalized, but would like to do it in the future, are more 
similar to immigrants who have already acquired German citizenship than to 
immigrants who do not want to naturalize at all.  
 
To the set of standard human capital and demographic characteristics such as 
education, gender, and marital status, we add characteristics that capture and describe 
the immigrants’ integration process into the German society and the immigrants’ 
ethnicity. Though it is still not evident whether acquisition of the destination 
country’s citizenship is a consequence of social, cultural or political integration, or 
whether citizenship fosters integration, it is nonetheless important to understand the   9
relationship between naturalization and integration. In addition, a clear perception of 
this relationship is useful for policy making directed at helping immigrants to become 
full-fledged members of the destination societies, with equal rights and 
responsibilities.   
 
How the economy of the origin compares to the economy of the host country and 
what kind of citizenship laws the home country has exert an important role in the 
immigrants’ decision to acquire the host country’s citizenship. We therefore test the 
country of origin influence by including the origin dummies. To learn about the effect 
of ethnicity on the immigrants’ decision to naturalize, we look also at the relationship 
between a migrant’s religion and citizenship status. We are particularly interested in 
finding out if and how being a Muslim defines the choice to naturalize, because the 
question of cultural and religious differences between the dominant Christian German 
society and Muslim minorities is often raised in Germ any.  In short, we a sk “ Are 
Muslims willing to become equal members of a free democratic constitutional system 
enshrined in the Basic Law through naturalization?”  
 
 
III. DATASET, VARIABLES, STATISTICS, AND MODELING 
 
We use the 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), a nationally 
representative survey collected yearly since 1984. The GSOEP reports extensive 
information on those ethnic groups of immigrants who started arriving to Germany as 
guestworkers in the late 1950s and 1960s, such as Turks, Greeks, Italians, Spaniards 
and people from the former Yugoslavia, but also immigrated after 1973, the year that 
marked the halt in the guestworker program. This rich dataset has information on pre-   10
and post-migration characteristics and, most importantly, willingness and plans to 
become a German citizen.  
 
Our sample concentrates on foreign-born immigrants who came from Turkey or from 
the former Yugoslavia. These legal immigrants are the only two sizable groups, 
sampled in the GSOEP, who are not part of the EU-25, and have a significant 
incentive to acquire German citizenship. Our sample is also restricted to those 
respondents who have been in Germany for more than eight years, and therefore, pass 
the residency requirement for German citizenship acquisition.
4 Moreover, because 
citizenship acquisition behavior of the family is greatly influenced by the head of the 
family we concentrate our analysis on household heads only. Accordingly, we end up 
with a sample of 387 immigrant household heads 25.3 percent of whom are females. 
 
To estimate the probability to acquire German citizenship we run several multinomial 
probit models gauging the effects of integration and ethnicity. The dependent variable 
in our econometric models distinguishes among three types of immigrants according 
to their citizenship status: a) immigrants who have acquired German citizenship; b) 
immigrants who express a willingness to acquire German citizenship in the future and 
c) immigrants who do not have and do not want to acquire German citizenship in the 
future. About 24.3 percent of the individuals of our sample are German citizens, and 
17.8 percent plan to apply for German citizenship. There are over fifty percent of 
immigrants expressing no willingness to acquire German citizenship. Interestingly, 
Table 2 reports that there are more German citizens among women immigrants than 
among men, and more women want to apply for German citizenship in the future than 
                                                 
4 Italians, Greeks and Spaniards in the GSOEP data set have not changed citizenship and have no 
relevant interest to naturalize.   11
men. The percent of German citizens among Muslim respondents is significantly 
lower than the percent of German citizens among non-Muslim respondents, but, on 
average, Muslims are more willing to acquire German citizenship than non-Muslims. 
 
The first set of independent variables consists of standard individual and human 
capital characteristics. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 report the mean and 
standard deviations of the featured characteristics of the whole sample and by gender, 
ethnicity and religion. Because we concentrate our analysis on non-German born 
household heads that have spent more than eight years in Germany, the average age of 
sampled individuals is high. Thus, the average immigrant in our sample is 48.6 years 
old, and those from the former Yugoslavia are much older (almost 52 years) than the 
Turks (almost 47 years). The vast majority of the respondents are married, but there 
are substantial gender differences: Only 51 percent of the females are married in 
comparison to 95.5 percent of the males. On average, immigrants have about ten years 
of total education either at home or in Germany, and the length of education does not 
vary dramatically across gender, ethnic and religious groups.  
 
The degree of immigrants’ integration into the German society is captured by 
education in Germany (a 0/1 dummy), age at arrival, length of stay in Germany (both 
variables measured in years), and having native Germans as close friends (a 0/1 
dummy). Only 38 percent of the total sample of immigrants acquired some education 
in Germany. The female and Turkish sub-samples contain the largest percentage of 
individuals with some education in Germany (47 and 46 percent, respectively). While, 
on average, immigrants from the former Yugoslavia are nearly one year longer   12
educated than Turkish immigrants, only 24.3 percent of the ex-Yugoslavs were 
educated in Germany in comparison to 46 percent of the Turks. 
 
While the average immigrant was about 19 years old at the time of arrival, this varies 
by gender. The average immigrant woman was only about 16 years old when she 
migrated to Germany. About 44 percent of our sample has at least one German friend, 
with a wide variation by gender. Interestingly, 63.3 percent of women have close 
friends among native Germans. In contrast, only about 38 percent of men report 
having German friends. Similarly, a higher percentage of non-Muslims and ex-
Yugoslavs has at least one native German friend compared to Turks and Muslims. 
 
The variable “more than 15 years of stay in Germany” goes to the heart of the 
assimilation literature. The longer one lives in the host country the more likely one is 
to successfully integrate. It is an empirical question whether longer exposure to the 
host country influences citizenship acquisition. Moreover, this variable controls for 
cohort differences. Acknowledging the possibility of differences in citizenship 
acquisition behavior between those who arrived to Germany fifteen years earlier and 
those who arrived later, this variable also accounts for the effects of earlier citizenship 
legislation on the acquisition behavior of immigrants. The German citizenship law 
was revised in 1999, when the German government decided that an immigrant should 
be qualified for German citizenship after eight years of legal residence in Germany, as 
opposed to fifteen years of residence under the old citizenship legislation. Thus, those 
immigrants who were not qualified for German citizenship according to the old law, 
but who are eligible for German citizenship under the new law might now be   13
motivated to acquire German citizenship. Table 2 shows that about ten percent of our 
sample has been in Germany for fifteen years or less.   
 
Immigrants in Germany also have heterogeneous arrival cohorts. Until 1973 most 
immigrants from Turkey or Yugoslavia came to Germany as guestworkers, recruited 
to help with the shortage of blue collar workers. As the German guestworker program 
for non-EU nationals ended in 1973 with the oil crisis intensifying a beginning 
recession, the Turks and Yugoslavs arriving after 1973 are mostly family members of 
those guestworkers who had settled in Germany. To account for this difference in 
cohorts, we include in some of our citizenship acquisition models a control for 
whether an immigrant arrived before 1973. Table 2 indicates that almost 54 percent of 
the sampled immigrants arrived to Germany prior to 1973, that is, as temporary 
workers. Table 2 further shows that Turks constitute 63.8 percent of the sample of 
which 78.5 percent are Muslims. Immigrants arriving from the former Yugoslavia 
account for the rest or 36.2 percent of the sample and among them 22.9 percent are 
Muslims.    
 
Ethnicity of the sampled respondents in our analysis is measured jointly by the 
country of origin and religion. Slightly more than a third of our sample originates 
from the former Yugoslavia, while the rest of the sample comes from Turkey. More 
than half are Muslims (58.4 percent), of whom 83.8 percent are Turks and the rest 
come from the former Yugoslavia.  
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Table 3 presents the results of four multinomial probit models of citizenship 
acquisition. The omitted category of the dependent variable refers to immigrants who 
do not have and do not plan to acquire German citizenship. The Base Model 
(Columns 1 and 5) is the bare minimum estimation based on the standard individual 
characteristics of immigrants such as gender, marital status and total years of 
education. In addition to these basic characteristics, the Integrationist Model 
(Columns 2 and 6) includes several indicators that capture how an immigrant has 
adjusted to German society. The Ethnicity Model (Columns 3 and 7) is the base 
model augmented by the migrants’ ethnic origin and religion. Finally, the Complete 
Model (Columns 4 and 8) encompasses all characteristics to study their joint effect on 
citizenship acquisition. 
 
Our Base Model (Column 1) indicates that there is a significant relationship between 
the immigrants’ basic characteristics and their plans to acquire German citizenship. 
Column 1 clearly shows that female immigrants are more likely to want to acquire 
German citizenship in the future than male immigrants, compared to the omitted 
reference category (of not wanting to acquire German citizenship). Migrant women 
are also more likely to have already obtained German citizenship than migrant men 
are (Column 5). While marriage positively affects the plans to obtain German 
citizenship in the future, it has no statistical significance on the probability to have 
already acquired German citizenship (given the reference category). Total years of 
education has a significant and positive impact on future plans to acquire German 
citizenship and an even stronger impact on the actual possession of citizenship.  
   15
The persistence of these effects, however, varies when controlling for additional 
individual characteristics. Gender differences in the demonstrated willingness to 
acquire German citizenship remain statistically significant only in the Ethnicity Model 
(Column 3). Taking into account the degree of an immigrant’s integration into the 
German society in the Integrationist and Complete Models eliminates the significant 
gender difference in the plans to acquire German citizenship in the future. However, 
gender differences remain positive and statistically significant across all four models 
when we estimate the actual possession of German citizenship (Columns 5 to 8). This 
finding shows overall strong gender differences with women having a higher 
proclivity to acquire German citizenship. All else constant, this could indicate that 
these immigrant women from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia find freedom and 
empowerment in becoming German citizens.  
 
Similarly, after controlling for the level of immigrants’ integration into the host 
society, marital status and years of education lose their statistical significance in 
predicting the willingness to acquire German citizenship. Yet, the above discussed 
positive relation between the length of education and actual possession of German 
citizenship remains significant across all four specifications of our citizenship models 
(Columns 5 to 8). Evidently, more educated immigrants are more likely to have 
naturalized in Germany compared to the reference category. This could be because 
with education immigrants realize the value of the German passport not only as a 
means of coming and going in and out of Germany easier, of avoiding visa issues and 
military service in the home country (for men), but as empowerment whereby they 
have voting rights, access to high end jobs and a better future for their children.   
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Our results show that it is important to account for the degree of immigrants’ 
integration into the host society when studying acquisition of host citizenship. The 
Integrationist Model in Columns 2 and 6 demonstrates that having native German 
friends positively influences the immigrants’ desire to acquire German citizenship as 
well as the likelihood of being naturalized. As expected, we also find that the younger 
a person is at the time of arrival to the host country the more eager one is to want to 
apply for German citizenship (Column 2) and to have acquired citizenship (Column 
6). Quite surprisingly, however, our analysis shows that a longer duration of stay in 
Germany is negatively associated with the willingness to become German in the 
future and with having German citizenship. Immigrants who came to Germany before 
1973 or those who have been in Germany for more than fifteen years are less likely to 
want to acquire German citizenship in the future (Column 2) and less likely to have 
naturalized (Column 6). This may reflect the fact that prior to the 1990s it was quite 
strenuous for foreigners to acquire German citizenship. By the time the citizenship 
legislation was relaxed, many immigrants might have become accustomed to life in 
Germany without German citizenship and being older did not want to expend the 
costs to acquire citizenship. The more recent immigrant arrivals, on the other hand, 
may still consider German citizenship beneficial for their life in Germany, and 
therefore, want to acquire it at the first opportunity. It is also possible that the 
psychology of those who arrived before 1973 as guestworkers impedes them from 
“becoming Germans.” Their whole wherewithal, mentality and demeanor may still be 
associated with the temporary program and the illusion of returning. Those who came 
under the family reunification scheme, however, may be more realistic in considering 
Germany home and wanting to ascend to citizenship.   
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The Integrationist Model of citizenship also demonstrates that while education in 
Germany does not significantly correlate with the immigrants’ willingness to acquire 
German citizenship in the future (Column 2), it is positively related to the probability 
of already holding German citizenship. For example, an immigrant who has some 
education in Germany is significantly more likely to have German citizenship than a 
migrant without any German education in relation to the reference category. 
However, this effect disappears once we control for additional individual 
characteristic in the Complete Model in Column 8. Apart from this exception, the 
impact of all measures of the immigrants’ integration into the German society remains 
strong and significant in the Complete Model, even after additional controls.  
 
Results from the Ethnicity Model in Columns 3 and 7 (Table 3) show that the origin 
and religion of immigrants also correlate with both the willingness to have and the 
actual possession of German citizenship, given the reference category of not willing 
to become German. Interestingly, Muslim immigrants are more likely to want to 
acquire, but less likely to have German citizenship than non-Muslims. Former 
Yugoslavs are no less eager to have German citizenship than non-Muslim Turkish 
immigrants are, but they are less likely to hold citizenship than non-Muslim Turks. 
These results change only slightly when additional controls for the immigrants’ level 
of integration are added in the Complete Model (Columns 4 and 8). Here we find that, 
when compared to non-Muslim Turks, immigrants coming from the former 
Yugoslavia are more likely to want, but are less likely to have German citizenship. In 
the same way, Muslim immigrants are more likely to want to acquire German 
citizenship, but are not more likely to hold German citizenship than non-Muslim 
migrants are.    18
 
We finally investigate the overall performance of the models using likelihood-ratio 
tests for excluding groups of variables affiliated with a particular model (see Table 4). 
The first row deals with the simple Integrationist Model (Column 1) and the simple 
Ethnicity Model (Column 2) comparing their likelihood values with the likelihood 
value of the Base Model. The chi-square test-statistics clearly reject the Base Model 
in both cases. In the second row we exclude from the Complete Model the integration 
factors (Column 1) or the ethnicity factors (Column 2). Again, the likelihood-ratio 
tests indicate that both set of variables matter, and both models have their 
contribution. We, however, also find that the Integration Model seems to have more 
power than the Ethnicity Model. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Less than a quarter of the legal immigrants from Turkey and the former Yugoslavia 
are German citizens, although they qualify for it. Moreover, previous conflicting 
findings on the impact of naturalization on successful economic integration in the host 
country (even after controlling for human capital and individual characteristics), 
prompt us to study the determinants of naturalization with a fresh approach. We use 
the 2005 wave of the German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) to study the effect of 
ethnicity and integration in the German society on the probability of citizenship 
acquisition for these two sizable non-EU immigrant groups. We distinguish three 
groups of immigrants; those who have acquired German citizenship, those who have 
not yet naturalized, but would like to in the future, and those who do not have and do 
not want to obtain German citizenship. We are particularly interested in understanding 
the direction of the relationship between immigrants’ integration in Germany and   19
their decision to naturalize, as well as in analyzing the relationship between the choice 
of German citizenship and immigrants’ ethnicity.  
 
Our empirical analysis indicates that immigrants who have naturalized and 
immigrants who would like to acquire German citizenship are different from 
immigrants who do not want to acquire German citizenship. Specifically, female 
immigrants are both more likely to want to acquire and to already have acquired 
German citizenship than male immigrants. This finding is robust across several 
specifications and shows that German citizenship is very valuable to women 
immigrants. Moreover, we find that married immigrants are more likely to want to 
have German citizenship, but there is no difference between married immigrants and 
those living alone in their actual citizenship status. Our results also show that more 
educated immigrants are more likely to want to naturalize in the future and to already 
have naturalized. This result remains strong across all employed multinomial probit 
models.   
 
We also find a strong relationship between the immigrants’ integration indicators into 
the German society and the probability to naturalize. Having close German friends is 
one of the strongest signs of a positive proclivity to German citizenship acquisition 
both actual and future. The younger immigrants are at arrival the greater are the odds 
that they have already acquired or that they want to acquire German citizenship. 
Education in Germany, however, correlates only marginally with acquisition of 
German citizenship. Much to our surprise, our empirical analysis indicates that the 
length of stay in Germany negatively affects the immigrants’ willingness to naturalize 
or to already have naturalized. We explain this finding by the fact that immigrants   20
who have resided in Germany for a long time (more than 15 years) without German 
citizenship learn to live without it, and see no reasons to change their citizenship 
status. Another possible explanation is that those immigrants who were recruited as 
guestworkers before 1973 have kept the mentality and psychology of the temporary 
program, they hold on to their passport, lulled by the thought that they will one day 
return back to their homeland. 
 
The ethnicity of immigrants, as manifested by country of origin and religion, is 
another important determinant of the immigrants’ decision to naturalize in Germany. 
The Complete Model of citizenship acquisition shows that immigrants from the 
former Yugoslavia are more willing to naturalize, but are less likely to be naturalized 
than immigrants from Turkey. Similarly, we find that Muslim immigrants in Germany 
are more willing to become German citizens than non-Muslim immigrants. Yet, there 
are fewer German citizens among Muslims than among non-Muslims. These results 
point to the existence of certain institutional or cultural barriers faced by certain 
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arrived 9 years ago
1
Potential outflow 
of immigrants who 
arrived 9 years ago
 
Potential number 
of immigrants who 
arrived 9 years ago 
and qualify to 
naturalize 
Actual number of 
naturalized 
immigrants 
2004   708,000
2  283,689
  424,311 127,153 
        
2005   788,300
2  396,840
  391,460 117,241 
 
Source: Own calculations using OECD Migration Outlook statistics on inflow, outflow, and stock of 
immigrants in Germany 
 
Note: Columns 3 and 4 compare the number of immigrants who acquired German citizenship in a 
corresponding year (Column 4) with the minimum number of immigrants who qualify to naturalized 
(Column 3). The minimum number of immigrants qualifying to acquire German citizenship is 
estimated as the number of immigrants who arrived to Germany 9 years ago (Column 1) minus the 
potential number of immigrants who arrived to Germany 9 years ago but left the country before the 
corresponding year (Column 2). The 9 year limit corresponds to the German naturalization law, 
according to which an immigrant qualifies for naturalization after 8 years of residency in Germany. An 
additional year (8+1=9) accounts for the length of the red-tape naturalization procedure. 
 
1 Eight years of minimum residency requirement plus 1 year of naturalization procedure 
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Table 2. Descriptive sample statistics (means, standard deviations) of foreign born in 
2005 
 
Characteristics  Total 
sample  Females Males  Turks  Ex-Yugo-
slavs  Muslims  Not 
Muslims 
         
Have  German  citizenship  0.243 0.367 0.201 0.263 0.207 0.199 0.304 
  0.429 0.485 0.401 0.441 0.407 0.400 0.462 
0.178 0.184 0.176 0.174 0.186 0.212 0.130  Plan to acquire German citizenship 
0.383 0.389 0.382 0.380 0.390 0.410 0.338 
Age  48.625 46.000 49.516 46.757 51.921 48.261 49.137 
  12.719 12.576 12.665 12.437 12.583 12.627 12.869 
Female  0.253      0.186 0.371 0.146 0.404 
  0.435      0.390 0.485 0.354 0.492 
Married  0.842 0.510 0.955 0.887 0.764 0.929 0.720 
  0.365 0.502 0.208 0.318 0.426 0.257 0.450 
Total years of education  10.328  10.306 10.336 10.018 10.875  9.987  10.807 
  2.319 2.508 2.256 2.164 2.486 2.254 2.331 
Education in Germany (dummy)  0.380  0.469  0.349  0.462  0.236  0.372  0.391 
  0.486 0.502 0.478 0.500 0.426 0.484 0.490 
Age  at  arrival  19.271 16.020 20.374 17.356 22.650 19.646 18.745 
  10.686 10.751 10.454 10.238 10.656 11.240  9.866 
Arrived  before  1973  0.537 0.592 0.519 0.478 0.643 0.456 0.652 
  0.499 0.494 0.501 0.501 0.481 0.499 0.478 
0.904 0.908 0.903 0.943 0.836 0.903 0.907  More than 15 years of stay in 
Germany  0.294 0.290 0.296 0.232 0.372 0.297 0.292 
Have  close  German  friends  0.442 0.633 0.377 0.381 0.550 0.341 0.584 
  0.497 0.485 0.486 0.487 0.499 0.475 0.494 
Turk  0.638  0.469  0.696    0.858  0.329 
  0.481  0.502  0.461    0.349  0.471 
Ex-Yugoslav  0.362  0.531  0.304    0.142  0.671 
  0.481  0.502  0.461    0.349  0.471 
Muslim  0.584 0.337 0.668 0.785 0.229     
  0.494 0.475 0.472 0.411 0.421    
         
Number  of  observations  387  98  289 247 140 226 161 
Note: Standard deviations in italics 
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Table 3. Multinomial probit models of citizenship acquisition; reference category is “do not want 
  to acquire German citizenship” 
 






































































































































          
Log-Likelihood  -361.739 -326.605 -351.957 -320.051 -361.739 -326.605 -351.957 -320.051 
Wald Chi-square  24.49  125.15  41.05  124.23 24.49  125.15 41.05  124.23 
N of observations  387  387 
 
Note: The reference group consists of non-Muslim Turk men with no education in Germany, who arrived to Germany after 1973 
and who do not want to acquire German citizenship; Dependent variable: equals 1 if a migrant does not have German 
citizenship but plans to acquire one in the future; equals 2 if a migrant is a German citizen; equals 0 if a person does not have 
and does not plan to acquire German citizenship (the reference category); one-tail z-test *** significant at 99%; ** significant at 
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Table 4. Likelihood-ratio test of integration and ethnicity effects 
 
Testing integration effect (1)  Testing ethnicity effect (2) 
  
In Integrationist Model  70.27***  In Ethnicity Model  19.56*** 
DF [4]  DF  [2] 
      
In Complete Model  63.81***  In Complete Model  13.11*** 
DF [4]  DF  [2] 
 
Note: Table shows chi-square values with degrees of freedom in brackets; Chi-square values are 
obtained from the comparison of the log-likelihood of the indicated model with the log-likelihood 
when the tested effect is excluded from the indicated model; *** significant at 99% 